Three-player social parasitism games: implications for resource defense and group formation.
Abstract: Individuals that produce resources are often exploited by several individuals; such exploitation may or may not be tolerated. We modeled the decision of a resource owner to accept one scrounger (the "satellite") and of both of these to accept being joined by another (the "floater"). In general, satellites tolerated floaters when competition between them was low, while owners tolerated satellites when facilitation between satellite and floater was high. When floaters were likely to find resources without joining, owners were more likely to resist satellites. In some cases, Nash equilibria were also mutually beneficial for two of the three individuals. Our model makes the counterintuitive prediction that mutually beneficial coalitions between satellites and floaters can only arise when the net benefits arising from the other's presence are low. When facilitation between satellites and floaters is high, satellites and owners may form mutually beneficial groups and groups with division of labor, or alternatively, owners may benefit from encouraging floaters to join. Finally, our model suggests there must be differences in competitive ability or some benefit of familiarity for owners to tolerate satellites but not floaters. We discuss empirical evidence for these and other predictions of the model.